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Abstract. According to Boutillier, Darwiche and Pearl and oth-
ers, principles for iterated revision can be characterised in terms of
changing beliefs about conditionals. For iterated contraction a simi-
lar formulation is not known. This is especially because for iterated
belief change the connection between revision and contraction via
the Levi and Harper identity is not straightforward, and therefore,
characterisation results do not transfer easily between iterated revi-
sion and contraction. In this article, we develop an axiomatisation
of iterated contraction in terms of changing conditional beliefs. We
prove that the new set of postulates conforms semantically to the
class of operators like the ones given by Konieczny and Pino Pérez
for iterated contraction.
1 Introduction
For the three main classes of theory change, revision, expansion and
contraction, different characterisations are known [12], which are
heavily supported by the correspondence between revision and con-
traction via the Levi and Harper identities [13, 17]. The situation is
different for iterated belief change, focussing on belief change oper-
ators which, due to their nature, can be applied iteratively and thus,
to more than one epistemic state. In this field, one of the most influ-
ential articles is the seminal paper [7] by Darwiche and Pearl (DP),
establishing the insight that belief sets are not a sufficient represen-
tation for iterated belief revision. An agent has to encode more in-
formation about her belief change strategy into her epistemic state
- where the revision strategy deeply corresponds with conditional
beliefs. This requires additional postulates that guarantee intended
behaviour in forthcoming changes, especially that the possibilities
of changing conditional beliefs is limited. The common way of se-
mantic encoding, also established by Darwiche and Pearl [7], is an
extension of Katsuno and Mendelzon’s characterisation of the class
of revisions by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson [1] in terms
of plausibility orderings [14], where it is assumed that the epistemic
states contain an order of the worlds (or interpretations).
Similar work has been done in recent years for iterated contraction.
Caridroit, Konieczny and Marquis [4] provided postulates for con-
traction in propositional logic and a characterisation with plausibility
orders in the style of Katsuno and Mendelzon [14]. By this charac-
terisation, the main characteristic of a contraction with α is that the
worlds of the previous state remain plausible and that the most plau-
sible counter-models of α become plausible. Chopra, Ghose, Meyer
and Wong [6] transferred these to the Darwiche-Pearl framework of
epistemic states, contributed semantic postulates for contraction on
epistemic states in the fashion of Darwiche and Pearl, and equivalent
1 FernUniversität in Hagen, Germany, kai.sauerwald@fernuni-hagen.de
2 Technical University Dortmund, Germany, gabriele.kern-isberner@cs.tu-
dortmund.de
3 FernUniversität in Hagen, Germany, christoph.beierle@fernuni-hagen.de
syntactic postulates that depend on a revision function. In the same
framework, Konieczny and Pino Pérez provided additional syntac-
tic iteration postulates for contraction which are independent from
revision operators [16]. However, none of these approaches on iter-
ated contraction provides a focus on conditionals like the work by
Darwiche and Pearl [7].
In this article, we develop a new set of syntactic postulates for it-
erated contraction. These new postulates for iterated contraction are
formulated in the fashion of Darwiche and Pearl. We show that our
set of postulates and the set of postulates given by Konieczny and
Pino Pérez [16] define the same class of contraction operators in the
light of the basic postulates. However, we argue that our new pos-
tulates highlight new aspects of iterated contraction operators. Espe-
cially, the new postulates highlight the specific role of conditionals
in the same manner as the postulates for iterative revision by Dar-
wich and Pearl do. For this we use specific conditionals for contrac-
tion, also called contractionals, which are studied by Bochman [2].
To develop some of the new postulates, we define an equivalence
relation for epistemic states with respect to a proposition. Further-
more, we argue that the new postulates are more succinct; dealing
less with changes of disjunctive beliefs. Succintness of postulates
is of particular importance when concepts on iterated belief change
developed for changes in propositional logic are translated to other
formalisms [8–10, 18], and also when belief contraction is used for
modelling phenomena, like forgetting (see the recent survey [11]).
In summary the main contributions of this article are:
• Postulates for iterated contraction and conditional beliefs
• A notion of relative equivalence for epistemic states
• Succinct iterated contraction postulates under relative equivalence
• Representation theorems for the sets of postulates
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides
the technical background, especially on belief change. In Section 3,
the role of conditional beliefs is explained, and contractionals and α-
equivalence is introduced. In Section 4, both new sets of postulates
for iterated contraction are proposed and characterisation results for
them are proven, finally resulting in an extended representation the-
orem for iterated contraction. Section 5 concludes and points out fu-
ture work.
2 Formal Background
We start by recalling basics of propositional logic and total preorders.
2.1 Propositional Logic
Let Σ be a propositional signature (non empty finite set of proposi-
tional variables) and L a propositional language over Σ. With lower
Greek letters α, β, γ, . . . we denote formulas in L and with lower
case letters a, b, c, . . . propositional variables from Σ. The set of
propositional interpretations Ω, also called set of worlds, is identified
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with the set of corresponding complete conjunctions over Σ. Propo-
sitional entailment is denoted by |=, the set of models of α with JαK,
and Cn(α) = {β | α |= β} is the deductive closure of α. For a set
X we define Cn(X) = {β | X |= β}. For a set of worlds Ω′ ⊆ Ω
and a total preorder≤ (total, reflexive and transitive relation) over Ω,
we denote with min(Ω′,≤) = {ω | ω ∈ Ω′ and ∀ω′ ∈ Ω′ ω ≤ ω′}
the set of all worlds in the lowest layer of ≤ that are elements in Ω′.
For a total preorder ≤, we denote with < its strict variant, i.e. x < y
iff x ≤ y and y 6≤ x; and we write x ' y iff x ≤ y and y ≤ x.
2.2 Epistemic States and Belief Changes
AGM theory [1], by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson, deals
with belief change in the context of belief sets, i.e., deductively
closed sets of propositions. In contrast, the area of iterated belief
change abstracts from a belief set to an epistemic state, sometimes
also called belief state, in which the agent maintains all necessary
information for her belief apparatus. With E we denote the set of
all epistemic states over L. Without defining what an epistemic state
is, we assume that for every epistemic state Ψ ∈ E we can obtain
the set of plausible sentences Bel(Ψ) ⊆ L of Ψ, which is deduc-
tively closed. We write Ψ |= α iff α ∈ Bel(Ψ) and we define
‖Ψ‖ = {ω | ω |= α for each α ∈ Bel(Ψ)}. A belief change op-
erator over L is a function ◦ : E × L → E .
Katsuno and Mendelzon [14] propose that an epistemic state Ψ
should be equipped with an ordering ≤Ψ of the worlds (interpreta-
tions), where the compatibility with Bel(Ψ) is ensured by the so-
called faithfulness.
Definition 1 (Faithful Assignment [14]). A function Ψ 7→≤Ψ that
maps each epistemic state to a total preorder on interpretations is said
to be a faithful assignment if and only if:
if ω1 ∈ ‖Ψ‖ and ω2 ∈ ‖Ψ‖, then ω1 'Ψ ω2(FA1)
if ω1 ∈ ‖Ψ‖ and ω2 /∈ ‖Ψ‖, then ω1 <Ψ ω2(FA2)
Intuitively,≤Ψ orders the worlds by plausibility, such that the min-
imal worlds with respect to ≤Ψ are the most plausible worlds.
2.3 Iterated Revision
Revision deals with the problem of incorporating new beliefs into an
agents belief set, thereby maintaining consistency. The well-known
approach to revision given by AGM [1], which implements the prin-
ciple of minimal change, has a counterpart in the framework of epis-
temic states.
Proposition 1 (AGM Revision for Epistemic States [7]). A belief
change operator ∗ is an AGM revision operator for epistemic states
if there is a faithful assignment Ψ 7→≤Ψ such that:
‖Ψ ∗ α‖ = min(JαK,≤Ψ) (1)
Driven by the insight that iteration needs additional constraints, Dar-
wiche and Pearl proposed the following postulates:
if α |= µ, then Bel(Ψ ∗ µ ∗ α) = Bel(Ψ ∗ α)(DP1)
if α |= ¬µ, then Bel(Ψ ∗ µ ∗ α) = Bel(Ψ ∗ α)(DP2)
if Ψ ∗ α |= µ, then (Ψ ∗ µ) ∗ α |= µ(DP3)
if Ψ ∗ α 6|= ¬µ, then (Ψ ∗ µ) ∗ α 6|= ¬µ(DP4)
It is well-known that these operators can be characterised in the se-
mantic framework of total preorders.
Proposition 2 (Iterated Revision [7]). Let ∗ be an AGM revision
operator for epistemic states. Then ∗ satisfies (DP1) to (DP4) if and
only there exists a faithful assignment Ψ 7→≤Ψ such that (1) and the
following postulates are satisfied:
(RR8) if ω1, ω2 ∈ JαK, then ω1≤Ψω2 ⇔ ω1≤Ψ∗αω2
(RR9) if ω1, ω2 ∈ J¬αK, then ω1≤Ψω2 ⇔ ω1≤Ψ∗αω2
(RR10) if ω1∈JαK and ω2∈J¬αK, then ω1<Ψω2⇒ω1<Ψ∗αω2
(RR11) if ω1∈JαK and ω2∈J¬αK, then ω1≤Ψω2⇒ω1≤Ψ∗αω2
2.4 Iterated Contraction
Contraction is the problem of withdrawing beliefs. Postulates for
AGM contraction in the framework of epistemic states where given
by Chopra, Ghose, Meyer and Wong [6], and by Caridroit, Konieczny
and Marquis [4] for propositional formula. Here, we give the formu-
lation by Chropra et al. [6]:
(C1) Bel(Ψ÷ α) ⊆ Bel(Ψ)
(C2) if α /∈ Bel(Ψ) , then Bel(Ψ) ⊆ Bel(Ψ÷ α)
(C3) if α 6≡ >, then α /∈ Bel(Ψ÷ α)
(C4) Bel(Ψ) ⊆ Cn(Bel(Ψ÷ α) ∪ {α})
(C5) if α ≡ β, then Bel(Ψ÷ α) = Bel(Ψ÷ β)
(C6) Bel(Ψ÷ α) ∩ Bel(Ψ÷ β) ⊆ Bel(Ψ÷ (α ∧ β))
(C7) if β /∈Bel(Ψ÷(α∧β)) , then Bel(Ψ÷(α∧β)) ⊆ Bel(Ψ÷β)
For an explanation of these postulates we refer to the article by
Caridroit et al. [4]. A characterisation in terms of total preorders on
epistemic states is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (AGM Contraction for Epistemic States [16]). A be-
lief change operator ÷ fulfils the postulates (C1) to (C7) if and only
if there is a faithful assignment Ψ 7→≤Ψ such that:
‖Ψ÷ α‖ = ‖Ψ‖ ∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ) (2)
For the purpose of the article we will say a belief change operator ÷
is an AGM contraction operator for epistemic states, if÷ fulfils (C1)
to (C7). The postulates (C1) to (C7) do not explicitly state how one
should maintain the contraction strategy in the case of iteration. It is
desirable to support AGM contraction operators for epistemic states
by additional postulates for iteration. Konieczny and Pino Pérez give
postulates4 for intended iteration behaviour of contraction [16]:
(IC8) if¬α |= γ, then
(
Bel(Ψ÷α)⊆Bel(Ψ÷(α∨β))
⇔ Bel(Ψ÷γ÷α)⊆Bel(Ψ÷γ ÷ (α∨β))
)
(IC9) if γ |=α, then
(
Bel(Ψ÷α)⊆Bel(Ψ÷(α ∨ β))
⇔ Bel(Ψ÷γ÷α)⊆Bel(Ψ÷γ÷(α ∨ β))
)
(IC10) if ¬β |=γ, then
(
Bel(Ψ÷γ÷α)⊆Bel(Ψ÷γ÷(α ∨ β))
⇒ Bel(Ψ÷α)⊆Bel(Ψ÷(α ∨ β))
)
(IC11) if γ |=β, then
(
Bel(Ψ÷γ÷α)⊆Bel(Ψ÷γ÷(α ∨ β))
⇒ Bel(Ψ÷α)⊆Bel(Ψ÷(α ∨ β))
)
For an explanation of (IC8) to (IC11) we refer to Konieczny and
Pino Pérez [16]. The class of operators fulfilling these postulates is
captured semantically by the following representation theorem.
4 The original formulation [16] uses a formula B(Ψ) instead of a belief set
Bel(Ψ).
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Proposition 4 (Iterated Contraction [16]). Let ÷ be an AGM con-
traction operator for epistemic states. Then ÷ satisfies (IC8) to
(IC11) if and only there exists a faithful assignment Ψ 7→≤Ψ such
that (2) and the following postulates are satisfied:
(CR8) if ω1, ω2 ∈ JαK, then ω1 ≤Ψ ω2 ⇔ ω1 ≤Ψ÷α ω2
(CR9) if ω1, ω2 ∈ J¬αK, then ω1 ≤Ψ ω2 ⇔ ω1 ≤Ψ÷α ω2
(CR10) if ω1∈J¬αK and ω2∈JαK, then ω1<Ψω2⇒ω1<Ψ÷αω2
(CR11) if ω1∈J¬αK and ω2∈JαK, then ω1≤Ψω2⇒ω1≤Ψ÷αω2
In the semantic perspective, the postulates (CR8) and (CR11) en-
sure that the order of worlds does not change if they are equivalent
in the perspective of contraction. The postulates and (CR10) and
(CR11) enforce that no world that contradicts the contracted infor-
mation is getting relatively more plausible after the contraction than
a world that was already more plausible before and does not contra-
dict the contracted information [15].
3 Conditionals and Belief Change
In the following, we will give some background on the interrelation
between conditionals and revisions. Then we introduce condition-
als which are related to contractions, called contractionals. We also
introduce α-equivalence, which is shown to be related to the accep-
tance of contractionals in an epistemic state.
3.1 Ramsey Test and Iterated Revision
One of the insights of belief-change theory is that a conditional be-
lief “if α, then usually β”, denoted here by (β |α ), is related to a
revision by the so-called Ramsey test [19]:
(RT) Ψ |= (β |α ) if and only if Ψ ∗ α |= β
Note that we did not yet define what Ψ |= (β |α ) means. For this,
we take the right side of (RT) as definition, i.e., (β |α ) is accepted in
Ψ, denoted by Ψ |= (β |α ), if Ψ ∗ α |= β. The conditional (β |α )
therefore depends then on ∗, and thus a notation like (β |α )∗ would
be more correct, but we omit the superscript here, since the context
is always clear.
The implication for iterated belief change is that the maintenance
of the change strategy of an agent is related to the change of con-
ditional beliefs. This leads to the representation by total preorders,
since conditionals can be related to total preorders. Let ≤ be a total
preorder over Ω. We say a Ramsey conditional (β |α ) is accepted
in ≤ if for every ωf ∈ Jα ∧ ¬βK there exists an ωv ∈ Jα ∧ βK such
that ωv < ωf. A formal statement about the correspondence between
acceptance and Ramsey test is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 5 ( [7]). Let ∗ be an AGM revision operator for epis-
temic states and Ψ 7→≤Ψ be a corresponding faithful assignment.
Then (β |α ) is accepted in ≤Ψ if and only if Ψ ∗ α |= β.
Darwiche and Pearl [7] propose the following interpretation of
their iteration postulates (DP1) to (DP4) in terms of conditionals:
(DP1cond) if α |= µ, then Ψ |= (β |α )⇔ Ψ ∗ µ |= (β |α )
(DP2cond) if α |= ¬µ, then Ψ |= (β |α )⇔ Ψ ∗ µ |= (β |α )
(DP3cond) if Ψ |= (µ |α ), then Ψ ∗ µ |= (µ |α )
(DP4cond) if Ψ 6|= (¬µ |α ), then Ψ ∗ µ 6|= (¬µ |α )
The formulation of (DP1cond) to (DP4cond) highlights that the iterative
belief revision postulates (DP1) to (DP4) enforce minimal change to
conditional beliefs under certain conditions.
3.2 Contractionals
By the Ramsey test, conditionals are connected to a revision opera-
tor. In an analogue way, one might think of conditionals which are
connected to a contraction operator. To distinguish such condition-
als from Ramsey test conditionals, we will call them contraction-
als [2] and denote them by [β |α ]. We suggest to read a contrac-
tional [β |α ] as “belief β even in the absence of α”. More formally,
we define that Ψ accepts [β |α ], written Ψ |= [β |α ], if Ψ÷α |= β.
Thus, analogue to (RT), we have the following correspondence:
(Contractional) Ψ |= [β |α ] if and only if Ψ÷ α |= β
Consider the following example for a comparison of the meaning
of contractionals to Ramsey test conditionals.
Example 1. Let f have the intended meaning that something is “able
to fly” and p the intended meaning that something is a “penguin”.
Then the acceptance of a (Ramsey test) conditional (¬f | p ) states
that if the agent is getting aware that something is a penguin, she
will believe that it is not able to fly. In contrast, the acceptance of
a contractional [¬f | p ] states that the agent keeps the belief that
something is not able to fly, even if the agent gives up her belief that
it is a penguin.
Like conditionals, contractionals can be related to total preorders.
We say that the contractional [β |α ] is accepted in a total preorder
≤ over Ω if min(Ω,≤) ⊆ JβK and for every ω1 ∈ J¬α ∧ ¬βK there
exists an ω2 ∈ J¬α ∧ βK such that ω2 < ω1. Supposing that ÷ is
an AGM contraction for epistemic states, then, via Proposition 3, a
contractional [β |α ] is accepted in ≤Ψ if and only if it is accepted
in Ψ.
3.3 α-Equivalence and Belief Contraction
For the case of iterated contraction, we need to restrain the notion of
equivalence of formulas to specific cases. In particular, we propose a
notion of equivalence which is relative to a proposition α, which we
call α-equivalence.
Definition 2 (α-equivalence). For two sets of interpretations
Ω1,Ω2 ⊆ Ω and a formula α we say Ω1 is α-equivalent to Ω2,
written Ω1 =α Ω2, if Ω1 and Ω2 contain the same set of models of
α, i.e. Ω1 ∩ JαK = Ω2 ∩ JαK.
This is lifted to two sets of formulas X,Y , by saying X is α-
equivalent to Y , written X =α Y , if JXK =α JY K. For sets of
formulas an alternative formulation is possible:
Proposition 6. Two sets of formulas X and Y are α-equivalent if
and only if Cn(X ∪ {α}) = Cn(Y ∪ {α}).
Intuitively, X and Y are α-equivalent if they agree on everything
about α. In the following we give an example which demonstrates
α-equivalence.
Example 2. Suppose a scenario about birds (b), penguins (p) and
flying (f ). Let X = Cn(b ∧ f, p → f) and Y = Cn(b ∧ f, p →
¬f) be belief sets which differ mainly in their beliefs about whether
a penguin can fly or not. The models of these two belief sets areJXK = {bfp, bfp} and JY K = {bfp}. Then X and Y agree in their
view on birds that are no penguins, X =b∧¬p Y , but they do not
agree in everything about birds, X 6=b Y .
3
Postulates using contractionals Equivalent non-conditional postulates
(C8cond) if ¬α |= β, then Ψ÷α |=[ γ∨¬α |β ]⇔Ψ |=[ γ ∨ ¬α |β ] (C8) if ¬α |= β, then Bel(Ψ÷ α÷ β) =α Bel(Ψ÷ β)
(C9cond) if α |= β, then Ψ÷α |= [ γ ∨ β |β ]⇔ Ψ |= [ γ ∨ β |β ] (C9) if α |= β, then Bel(Ψ÷ α÷ β) =¬β Bel(Ψ÷ β)
(C10cond) if ¬α |= γ, then Ψ |= [ γ |β ]⇒ Ψ÷ α |= [ γ |β ] (C10) if ¬α |= γ, then Ψ÷ β |= γ ⇒ Ψ÷ α÷ β |= γ
(C11cond) if α |= γ, then Ψ÷ α |= [ γ |β ]⇒ Ψ |= [ γ |β ] (C11) if α |= γ, then Ψ÷ α÷ β |= γ ⇒ Ψ÷ β |= γ
Figure 1: Overview of the two sets of postulates for iterated contraction developed in this article.
We will use the notion of α-equivalence as a tool to describe in-
variants for belief changes. As an example consider the following
proposition, holding for every AGM contraction.
Proposition 7. For every AGM contraction operator for epistemic
states ÷ and all propositions α, β the following postulate holds:
if ¬α ∧ β ≡ ⊥, then Bel(Ψ) =β Bel(Ψ÷ α)
Proof. Assume α, β such that ¬α ∧ β ≡ ⊥. By Proposition 3 there
is a faithful assignment Ψ 7→≤Ψ such that (2) is fulfilled. Since ¬α∧
β ≡ ⊥ holds, ¬α and β have no models in common. Therefore, we
can infer that the set min(J¬αK,≤Ψ) contains no models of β. Thus
from ‖Ψ÷α‖ = ‖Ψ‖∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ) we can derive ‖Ψ÷α‖ =β
‖Ψ‖, which is equivalent to Bel(Ψ) =β Bel(Ψ÷ α).
The following proposition relates α-equivalence of beliefs to the
acceptance of contractionals.
Proposition 8. Let ÷ be an AGM contraction operator for epis-
temic states, Ψ,Φ be epistemic states and α, β propositions. Then
Bel(Ψ÷ β) =α Bel(Φ÷ β) holds if and only if for all propositions
γ we have Ψ |= [α→ γ |β ]⇔ Φ |= [α→ γ |β ].
Proof. For the “only if” direction let Bel(Ψ÷ β) =α Bel(Φ÷ β).
This is equivalent to:
‖Ψ÷ β‖ ∩ JαK = JΦ÷ βK ∩ JαK (3)
Assume now (without loss of generality) that Ψ |= [ γ ∨¬α |β ] and
Φ 6|= [ γ ∨ ¬α |β ]. Then we get an contradiction, since there must
be a world ω ∈ J¬γ ∧ αK such that ω ∈ JΦ÷ βK, which contradicts
the assumption in combination with Equation (3).
In the “if” direction, for all propositions γ it holds hat Ψ |= [ γ ∨
¬α |β ]⇔ Φ |= [ γ ∨ ¬α |β ]. Towards a contradiction assume now
that ‖Ψ÷ β‖ ∩ JαK 6= JΦ÷ βK∩ JαK. This implies (without loss of
generality) that there is a world ω such that ω /∈ ‖Ψ÷ β‖ ∩ JαK but
ω ∈ ‖Φ÷ β‖ ∩ JαK. Now let γ be a formula such that JγK = ‖Ψ÷
β‖∩JαK. Clearly, it holds that Ψ÷β |= γ∨¬α and Φ÷β 6|= γ∨¬α.
By the correspondence between contractionals and contractions this
is a contradiction the our assumption.
4 Postulates for Iterated Contraction
While for the Darwiche-Pearl iteration postulates for revision a trans-
lation to postulates about changing conditionals via the Ramsey test
is easy, the postulates (IC8) to (IC11) do not allow for an easy trans-
lation into postulates about belief change for contractionals.
In the rest of the article we develop an equivalent contractional
representation for iterated contraction. We will also give a condi-
tional variant of these new postulates. The two groups of postulates
are summarised in Figure 1. The postulates have been developed
from (CR8) to (CR11), which are equivalent to (IC8) to (IC11) due
to Proposition 4.
4.1 Syntactic Postulates for (CR8) and (CR9)
In the following, for iterated contraction we define two principles
which correspond to (CR8) and (CR9), specifying situations in which
beliefs after a contraction are not influenced by specific prior contrac-
tions. Both (CR8) and (CR9) state that worlds that can not be distin-
guished from the point of view of a the contracted formula, should
not change their plausibility. In particular, (CR8) enforces this con-
dition for the models of α, thus it is natural to specify the following
postulate:
(C8) if ¬α |= β, then Bel(Ψ÷ α÷ β) =α Bel(Ψ÷ β)
Explanation: The beliefs about α after a contraction with β are
independent from whether α was contracted previously or not, if
β is more general than the negation of α.
The postulate (CR9) enforces the same condition for models of ¬α,
which is captured by the following postulate:
(C9) if α |= β, then Bel(Ψ÷ α÷ β) =¬β Bel(Ψ÷ β)
Explanation: The beliefs about ¬β after a contraction with β are
independent from whether α was contracted previously or not, if
β is more general than α.
We will now show that (C8) and (C9) are equivalent to (CR8) and
(CR9) for AGM contraction operators on epistemic states.
Proposition 9. Let÷ be an AGM contraction operator for epistemic
states. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(a) The operator ÷ satisfies the postulates (C8) and (C9).
(b) There is a faithful assignment Ψ 7→≤Ψ related to ÷ by (2) such
that (CR8) and (CR9) are satisfied.
Proof. We will show that (a) implies (b) and that (b) implies (a).
Part I: We start with the (b) to (a) direction. Let ÷ be an AGM
contraction operator for epistemic states, thus fulfilling (C1) to (C7),
and let Ψ 7→≤Ψ be a faithful assignment related to ÷ by (2) such
that (CR8) to (CR9) are fulfilled. We show that (C8) and (C9) are
satisfied:
(C8) Let ¬β |= α, which is equivalent to ¬α |= β. As in the proof
of (CR9), Equation (2) implies
‖Ψ÷ α÷ β‖ = ‖Ψ‖ ∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ) ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α),(4)
for every α, β. Furthermore, by (CR8) and ¬β |= α it holds that:
min(J¬βK,≤Ψ) = min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α) (5)
Combining (4) with (5) yields:
‖Ψ÷α÷ β‖ = ‖Ψ‖ ∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ)∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ) (6)
By using ‖Ψ÷β‖ = ‖Ψ‖∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ) obtained from Equa-
tion (2) and using min(J¬αK,≤Ψ) ∩ JαK = ∅, from (6) we con-
clude that
‖Ψ÷ α÷ β‖ ∩ JαK = ‖Ψ÷ β‖ ∩ JαK (7)
4
holds, which is equivalent to the required result
Bel(Ψ÷ α÷ β) =α Bel(Ψ÷ β).
(C9) Let ¬β |= ¬α, which is equivalent to α |= β. By (CR9) and
¬β |= ¬α it holds that:
min(J¬βK,≤Ψ) = min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α) (8)
Combining Equation (4) that holds for every α, β with (8) yields:
‖Ψ÷α÷ β‖ = ‖Ψ‖ ∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ)∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ) (9)
By using ¬β |= ¬α we conclude that there are only two possible
cases:
min(J¬αK,≤Ψ) ∩ J¬βK = ∅, or(10)
min(J¬αK,≤Ψ) ∩ J¬βK = min(J¬βK,≤Ψ) ∩ J¬βK.(11)
In both cases, (10) and (11), from (9) we directly infer:
‖Ψ÷ α÷ β‖ ∩ J¬βK = ‖Ψ‖ ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ) ∩ J¬βK (12)
From (12) and ‖Ψ÷β‖ = ‖Ψ‖∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ), obtained from
Equation (2), we conclude that
‖Ψ÷ α÷ β‖ ∩ J¬βK = ‖Ψ÷ β‖ ∩ J¬βK (13)
holds, which is equivalent to Bel(Ψ÷ α÷ β) =¬β Bel(Ψ÷ β).
Part II: For the (a) to (b) direction suppose that÷ is an AGM con-
traction operator for epistemic states. Further assume that÷ satisfies
(C8) and (C9). By Proposition 3 there exists a faithful assignment
Ψ 7→≤Ψ such that for every proposition α Equation (2) holds. We
will show that Ψ 7→≤Ψ satisfies (CR8) and (CR9).
(CR8) Suppose ω1, ω2 ∈ JαK. We choose β = ¬(ω1 ∨ ω2) and
therefore, we have ¬α |= β and ¬β |= α. By (C8) we have
Bel(Ψ÷ α÷ β) =α Bel(Ψ÷ β), which implies:
‖Ψ÷ β‖ =α ‖Ψ÷ α÷ β‖, (14)
which is equivalent to ‖Ψ ÷ β‖ ∩ JαK = ‖Ψ ÷ α ÷ β‖ ∩ JαK.
From Equation (2) we obtain that
‖Ψ÷ α÷ β‖ = ‖Ψ÷ α‖ ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α)
= ‖Ψ‖ ∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ) ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α)(15)
and
‖Ψ÷ β‖ = ‖Ψ‖ ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ). (16)
Substituting (15) and (16) into Equation (14) leads to
(17) ‖Ψ‖ ∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ) ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α)
=α ‖Ψ‖ ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ).
Equation (17) is equivalent to:
(18) (‖Ψ‖ ∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ) ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α)) ∩ JαK
= (‖Ψ‖ ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ)) ∩ JαK
Because min(J¬αK,≤Ψ)∩JαK=∅, Equation (17) is equivalent to:
(19) (‖Ψ‖ ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α)) ∩ JαK
= (‖Ψ‖ ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ)) ∩ JαK
Remember that ¬β |= α and therefore J¬βK ⊆ JαK. Equation
(19) implies
(20) (‖Ψ‖ ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α)) ∩ J¬βK
= (‖Ψ‖ ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ)) ∩ J¬βK,
which is equivalent to ‖Ψ‖ ∪ min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α) =¬β ‖Ψ‖ ∪
min(J¬βK,≤Ψ).
We will now show that the following holds:
min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α) = min(J¬βK,≤Ψ) (21)
Case 1: Consider the case of ‖Ψ‖ ∩ J¬βK 6= ∅. Because
of the faithfulness of the assignment, it must be the case that
min(J¬βK,≤Ψ) ⊆ ‖Ψ‖. Moreover, min(J¬βK,≤Ψ) is exactly
the set of models of ¬β contained in ‖Ψ‖, i.e.:
‖Ψ‖ ∩ J¬βK = min(J¬βK,≤Ψ) (22)
From Equation (2) in Proposition (3) we easily get
‖Ψ÷ α‖ ∩ JαK = (‖Ψ‖ ∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ)) ∩ JαK, (23)
which is, because of min(|= (¬α),≤Ψ)∩ JαK = ∅, equivalent to:
‖Ψ÷ α‖ ∩ JαK = ‖Ψ‖ ∩ JαK (24)
Since ¬β |= α, the set ‖Ψ÷ α‖ contains the same models of ¬β
as ‖Ψ‖, i.e.:
‖Ψ÷ α‖ ∩ J¬βK = ‖Ψ‖ ∩ J¬βK (25)
Due to our assumption ‖Ψ‖ ∩ J¬βK 6= ∅, this implies ‖Ψ÷ α‖ ∩J¬βK 6= ∅. Then, because of the faithfulness of the assignment, it
must be the case that min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α) ⊆ ‖Ψ÷ α‖. Moreover,
min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α) is exactly the set of models of ¬β contained
in ‖Ψ÷ α‖, i.e.:
‖Ψ÷ α‖ ∩ J¬βK = min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α) (26)
Together, Equations (22), (25) and (26), imply Equation (21) in
this case.
Case 2: We now consider the other case ‖Ψ‖ ∩ J¬βK = ∅. Since
¬β |= α and min(J¬αK,≤Ψ) contains no models of α, it must be
the case that
‖Ψ‖ ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α) =α ‖Ψ‖ ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ). (27)
We directly conclude from Equation (27) that Equation (21) holds,
which finishes the proof of Equation (21).
Note that J¬βK has only two elements, J¬βK = {ω1, ω2} ⊆ JαK,
and thus information about the minima provides us the relative
order of the two elements ω1 and ω2. So, from Equation (21), we
can conclude that ω1 ≤Ψ ω2 if and only if ω1 ≤Ψ÷α ω2.
(CR9) Suppose ω1, ω2 ∈ J¬αK. We choose β = ¬(ω1 ∨ ω2)
and therefore, we have α |= β. By (C9) we have
Bel(Ψ÷ α÷ β) =¬β Bel(Ψ÷ β), which implies:
‖Ψ÷ β‖ ∩ J¬βK = ‖Ψ÷ α÷ β‖ ∩ J¬βK (28)
From Equation (2) we obtain that
‖Ψ÷ α‖ = ‖Ψ‖ ∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ),(29)
‖Ψ÷ β‖ = ‖Ψ‖ ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ)(30)
and employing Equation (2) twice yields:
‖Ψ÷ α÷ β‖ = ‖Ψ‖ ∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ) ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α).(31)
Substituting (31) and (30) into Equation (28) leads to
(32) (‖Ψ‖∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ))∩J¬βK
= (‖Ψ‖∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ)∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α))∩J¬βK.
Note that every model of ¬β is a model of ¬α, therefore, either
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one of the following holds:
min(J¬αK,≤Ψ) ∩ J¬βK = ∅, or(33)
min(J¬αK,≤Ψ) ∩ J¬βK = min(J¬βK,≤Ψ).(34)
In the case of (33), Equation (32) re-
duces to (‖Ψ‖ ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ)) ∩ J¬βK =
(‖Ψ‖ ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α)) ∩ J¬βK. Furthermore, from
(33) and ¬β |= ¬α we conclude ‖Ψ‖ ∩ J¬βK = ∅. This allows
to conclude min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α) = min(J¬βK,≤Ψ).
For the other case, the case of (34), note that min(J¬αK,≤Ψ) ⊆
‖Ψ ÷ α‖. By Equation (34) it must hold that min(J¬βK,≤Ψ) ⊆
‖Ψ÷ α‖. By the faithfulness of Ψ 7→≤Ψ (in particular con-
dition (FA1) in Definition 1) we have min(J¬βK,≤Ψ) =
min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α), because the minimal models of ¬β with re-
spect to ≤Ψ÷α are contained in ‖Ψ÷ α‖ by (29) and (34).
In summary, in both cases, (33) and (34), we can conclude:
min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α) = min(J¬βK,≤Ψ) (35)
Note that J¬βK has only two elements, J¬βK = {ω1, ω2} ⊆J¬αK, and thus information about the minima provides us the rel-
ative order of the two elements ω1 and ω2. From Equation (35) we
can conclude that ω1 ≤Ψ ω2 if and only if ω1 ≤Ψ÷α ω2.
One might wonder, why we not simply use the following postulate
as syntactic counterpart to (CR9):
(C9′) if α |= β, then Bel(Ψ÷ α÷ β) =¬α Bel(Ψ÷ β)
The following proposition shows that this would not hold.
Proposition 10. There is an AGM contraction operator for epistemic
states that satisfies (CR9) but violates (C9′).
Proof. Consider the case where α = a and β = a ∨ b. Clearly, we
have α |= β in this case. Table 1 specifies a faithful preorder for the
epistemic state Ψ and for states after contraction with α and β. Note
that none of the changes in Table 1 violates (CR9). But the most plau-
sible models in≤Ψ÷a÷(a∨b) and≤Ψ÷(a∨b) contain different models
of ¬α. This implies that Bel(Ψ÷ α÷ β) 6=¬α Bel(Ψ÷ β), which
is a violation of (C9′).
State Ψ Ψ÷ a Ψ÷ a÷ (a ∨ b) Ψ÷ (a ∨ b)
TPO ≤Ψ ≤Ψ÷a ≤Ψ÷a÷(a∨b) ≤Ψ÷(a∨b)
implausible ab ab ab ab ab ab ab
plausible ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab
Table 1: Example for the incompatibility between (CR9) and (C9′).
The correspondence between contractionals and contractions from
Section 3 and Proposition 8 allows us to give a conditional formula-
tion of the postulates (C8) and (C9):
(C8cond) if ¬α |= β, then Ψ÷α |=[ γ∨¬α |β ]⇔Ψ |=[ γ ∨ ¬α |β ]
(C9cond) if α |= β, then Ψ÷α |= [ γ ∨ β |β ]⇔ Ψ |= [ γ ∨ β |β ]
We close with a formal statement about the interrelationship between
the conditional and non-conditional variant for these postulates.
Proposition 11. Let ÷ be an AGM contraction operator for epis-
temic states. Then, (C8), respectively (C9), is satisfied by ÷ if and
only if (C8cond), respectively (C9cond), is satisfied.
4.2 Syntactic Postulates for (CR10) and (CR11)
The postulates (CR10) and (CR11) both ensure that by a contraction
with α, models of α should not be improved with respect to models
of ¬α. In the context of AGM contractions for epistemic states we
use here, this is expressed by the following postulates:
(C10cond) if ¬α |= γ, then Ψ |= [ γ |β ] implies Ψ÷ α |= [ γ |β ]
Explanation: A contraction with α preserves the acceptance of a
contractional if its conclusion γ is more general than ¬α.
(C11cond) if α |= γ, then Ψ÷ α |= [ γ |β ] implies Ψ |= [ γ |β ]
Explanation: If a contractional whose conclusion γ is more gen-
eral than α is accepted after a contraction with α, then the con-
tractional should be accepted previously.
By using contraposition and the correspondence between contrac-
tionals and contractions, the following non-conditional formulation
of the principles (C10cond) and (C11cond) can be obtained:
(C10) if ¬α |= γ, then Ψ÷ β |= γ ⇒ Ψ÷ α÷ β |= γ
(C11) if α |= γ, then Ψ÷ α÷ β |= γ ⇒ Ψ÷ β |= γ
Note that AGM contractions for epistemic states fulfil the inclu-
sion postulate (C1), and therefore no contraction can add additional
beliefs. The postulates (C10) and (C11) constrain further which be-
liefs should be retained. The postulate (C10) ensures that a contrac-
tion with α does not internally give up beliefs. The postulate (C11)
is more difficult, stating that if two contractions do not withdraw a
belief γ, then the second contraction only does not withdraw γ.
The following proposition states the connection between (C10cond)
and (C10), and between (C11cond) and (C11).
Proposition 12. Let ÷ be an AGM contraction operator for epis-
temic states. Then (C10cond), respectively (C11cond), is satisfied ÷ if
and only if (C10cond), respectively (C11cond), is fulfilled.
We show for the non-conditional postulates (C10) and (C10) that
they are related to (CR10) and (CR11).
Proposition 13. Let ÷ be a belief change operator, satisfying (C1)
to (C9). Then the following statements are equivalent:
(a) The operator ÷ satisfies the postulates (C10) and (C11)
(b) There is a faithful assignment Ψ 7→≤Ψ related to ÷ by (2) such
that (CR10) and (CR11) are satisfied.
Proof. In the following, we will show that (b) implies (a) and that
(a) implies (b).
Part I: We show the (b) to (a) direction. Let ÷ be a belief change
operator fulfilling (C1) to (C9). By Proposition 9, there is a faithful
assignment Ψ 7→≤Ψ related to ÷ by (2) such that (CR8) and (CR9)
are fulfilled. We will show that (C10) and (C11) are satisfied.
(C10) Let ¬α |= γ and Ψ÷ β |= γ. We want to show that Ψ÷α÷
β |= γ holds. By Equation (2) we obtain
‖Ψ÷ β‖ = ‖Ψ‖ ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ) ⊆ JγK (36)
and with Equation (4) which holds for every α, β we get:
‖Ψ÷α÷β‖=‖Ψ‖∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ)∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α).(37)
We show that every ω ∈ ‖Ψ ÷ α ÷ β‖ is a model of γ. By
Equation (37) either ω ∈ ‖Ψ‖, ω ∈ min(J¬αK,≤Ψ) or ω ∈
min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α). For these three cases we have:
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• If ω ∈ ‖Ψ‖, then by Equation (36) we have ω |= γ.
• If ω ∈ min(J¬αK,≤Ψ÷α), then by the assumption ¬α |= γ
we have ω |= γ.
• For ω ∈ min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α) assume that ω |= ¬γ. If ω |= ¬α,
then ω |= γ by the assumption ¬α |= γ. Therefore, we can
safely assume ω |= α. Since min(J¬βK,≤Ψ) ⊆ JγK, there
must be ω1 ∈ min(J¬βK,≤Ψ) such that ω1 <Ψ ω. If ω1, ω ∈JαK, then ω1 <Ψ÷α ω by (CR8). For ω1 ∈ J¬αK and ω ∈ JαK
we conclude ω1 <Ψ÷α ω by (CR10). Thus, it must be the case
that ω1 <Ψ÷α ω, which is a contradiction to the minimality of
ω with respect to ≤Ψ÷α.
Equation (37) implies that ω |= γ, and therefore Ψ÷α÷β |= γ.
(C11) Let α, β, γ be such that α |= γ and Ψ ÷ α ÷ β |= γ. We
want to show Ψ ÷ β |= γ. By Equation (2) we have ‖Ψ‖ ⊆JγK and min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α) ⊆ JγK. Now let ω1 ∈ J¬βK such that
ω1 /∈ min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α). We show that ω1 /∈ min(J¬βK,≤Ψ) or
ω1 |= γ. Let ω2 ∈ min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α) and thus, ω2 <Ψ÷α ω1.
We differentiate by cases:
1. For ω1 ∈ JαK the assumption α |= γ immediately yields ω |=
γ.
2. In the case of ω1 ∈ J¬αK and ω2 ∈ JαK we conclude ω2 <Ψ
ω1 by contraposition of (CR11).
3. In the case of ω1, ω2 ∈ J¬αK we conclude by (CR9) that
ω2 <Ψ ω1 holds.
This shows that eitherω2 <Ψ ω1 orω1 |= γ. The first case implies
ω1 /∈ min(J¬βK,≤Ψ), and thus yields min(J¬βK,≤Ψ) ⊆ JγK. In
summary, we have ‖Ψ÷ β‖ = ‖Ψ‖ ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ) ⊆ JγK.
Part II: We show the (a) to (b) direction. Suppose that÷ is a belief
change operator that satisfies (C1) to (C11). By Proposition 3 there
exists a faithful assignment Ψ 7→≤Ψ such that for every proposition
α Equation (2) holds. We will show that Ψ 7→≤Ψ satisfies (CR10)
and (CR11).
(CR10) Suppose ω1 ∈ J¬αK, ω2 ∈ JαK and ω1 <Ψ ω2. We want to
show ω1 <Ψ÷α ω2. For this purpose let β = ¬(ω1 ∨ ω2). Since
Ψ 7→≤Ψ is a faithful assignment (especially by (FA2)) it must be
the case that ω2 /∈ ‖Ψ‖. By use of Equation (2) we can conclude
that ω2 /∈ ‖Ψ ÷ β‖ and ω1 ∈ ‖Ψ ÷ β‖. Now let γ = γ′ ∨ ¬α,
where γ′ is a formula such that ‖Ψ ÷ β‖ ∪ {ω1} = Jγ′K. Thus,
¬α |= γ, whereby ω1 |= γ and ω2 6|= γ. From (C10) we conclude
Ψ÷ α÷ β |= γ. This implies that ω2 /∈ ‖Ψ÷ α÷ β‖. Note thatJ¬βK = {ω1, ω2} and thus, by Equation (2) it must be the case
that ω1 ∈ ‖Ψ ÷ α ÷ β‖ or ω2 ∈ ‖Ψ ÷ α ÷ β‖. Since the latter
leads to a contradiction, we conclude ω1 ∈ ‖Ψ÷ α÷ β‖, and in
summary ω1 <Ψ÷α ω2.
(CR11) We show (CR11) by contraposition. Suppose ω1 ∈ J¬αK,
ω2 ∈ JαK and ω2 <Ψ÷α ω1. We will show ω2 <Ψ ω1. Since
Ψ 7→≤Ψ is a faithful assignment, and thus fulfils especially (FA2),
it must be the case that ω1 /∈ ‖Ψ ÷ α‖. For β = ¬(ω1 ∨ ω2) we
can conclude by Equation (2) that ‖Ψ ÷ α ÷ β‖ = ‖Ψ ÷ α‖ ∪
min(J¬βK,≤Ψ÷α). Because of ω2 <Ψ÷α ω1 we have ‖Ψ÷α÷
β‖ = ‖Ψ÷α‖∪{ω2}. Now let γ = γ′∨α, where γ′ is a formula
such that Jγ′K = ‖Ψ ÷ α‖ ∪ {ω2}. By definition of γ it is the
case that Ψ÷ α÷ β |= γ. Furthermore, by definition α |= γ and
ω1 6|= γ and ω2 |= γ. By using (C11) we can conclude Ψ÷β |= γ.
Note that by Equation (2) it must be the case that ω1 ∈ ‖Ψ ÷ β‖
or ω2 ∈ ‖Ψ ÷ β‖. Since Ψ ÷ β |= γ the former is not possible,
so by (FA2) we have ω2 <Ψ ω1.
4.3 Extended Representation Theorem for
Iterative Contraction
We now employ the results from Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 to show
our main theorem for our new sets of postulates, which are sum-
marised in Figure 1.
Theorem 1 (Extended Representation Theorem). Let ÷ be an AGM
contraction operator for epistemic states. Then the following state-
ments are equivalent:
(a) The operator ÷ fulfils (C8) to (C11).
(b) The operator ÷ fulfils (C8cond) to (C11cond).
(c) The operator ÷ fulfils (IC8) to (IC11).
(d) There is a faithful assignment Ψ 7→≤Ψ related to ÷ by (2) such
that (CR8) to (CR11) are satisfied.
Proof. The equivalence of (c) and (d) is given by Proposition 4. By
Proposition 12 and Proposition 11 we get the equivalence between
(a) and (b). Finally, by Proposition 9 and Proposition 13 the state-
ments (a) and (d) are equivalent.
Note that we could extend Theorem 1 to cover also the syntac-
tic postulates for iterated contractions by Chopra, Ghose, Meyer and
Wong [6]. Their contraction postulates depend on a revision; this
complicates specifying a class of operators, since for instance in the
iterative case there are more revisions than contractions [16].
By Theorem 1 the class of AGM contraction operators which ful-
fil the iteration postulates (IC8) to (IC11) for contraction can be ex-
pressed equivalently by any of the two groups of postulates (C8) to
(C11) and (C8cond) to (C11cond) developed here in this paper and sum-
marised in Figure 1.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We take a conditional perspective on iterated contraction by develop-
ing a set of postulates (C8cond) to (C11cond), which highlight condi-
tional beliefs that are retained by an iterative contraction. Addition-
ally, we provide a set of syntactic postulates (C8) to (C11) for iterated
contraction which are more succinct than (IC8) to (IC11) proposed
in [16]. Moreover, without (C8) to (C11) it would be difficult to ob-
tain (C8cond) to (C11cond). We proved an extended representation the-
orem for iterated contraction, which shows that all these different sets
of postulates describe the same set of operators.
The notion of α-equivalence was introduced as a form of equiva-
lence between epistemic states with respect to a proposition α. We
showed the usefulness of this relation for postulation and how it al-
lows to provide insight about invariants in belief change.
For the postulates (C8cond) to (C11cond) we use specific condi-
tionals, called contractionals, which are connected to contractions
in the same manner as the Ramsey test draws a connection to re-
visions. Contractionals have been studied in the context of inference
by Bochman [2]. Furthermore, we showed that α-equivalence is con-
nected to the acceptance of contractionals. To the best of our knowl-
edge, contractionals have not been used in the context of iterated
revision so far.
In future work we will explore the connection between Ramsey
test conditionals and contractionals in the setting of iterated belief
change; for this, the recent work by Booth and Chandler on the corre-
spondence between iterated revision and contraction [3], employing
closure operators over conditionals [5], will be useful.
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